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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

JOSHUA MICHAEL MOSES,
Defendant-Appel/ant.

NO. 41275
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2010-15159

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
ON REVIEW

--------------------)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This Court has granted the State's petition for review in the above-captioned
case. Following a jury trial, Joshua Moses was convicted of grand theft by extortion,
along with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. On appeal, he al/eges several
claims of error occurring at his trial, each of which warrant reversal of this conviction.
First, Mr. Moses asserts that the district court erred when it permitted statements
made on a phone call by another individual to be introduced as adoptive admissions
against him where the State failed to establish the required foundation prior to their
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introduction. Second, Mr. Moses asserts that the district court erred when it prevented
him from making further inquiry about a juror who had indicated to the court the juror
was struggling with fulfilling his obligations during the trial because the juror was
suffering from anxiety issues.

Third, Mr. Moses asserts that the district court erred

when it refused to permit him to introduce evidence of prior consistent statements made
by an unavailable witness at trial, after the State had been permitted to introduce prior
inconsistent statements made by the same witness.
In addition, Mr. Moses maintains the prosecutor committed misconduct during
closing argument when he attempted to shift the burden of proof to Mr. Moses.

He

further asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to the level of a
fundamental error, when the prosecutor misled the jury as to the nature of the immunity
agreement between a witness and the State, and appealed to the passions and
prejudice of the jurors.
Finally, Mr. Moses submits that the aggregate effect of these errors requires
reversal under the cumulative error doctrine.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Joshua Moses was originally charged with robbery, grand theft by extortion, and
kidnapping in the first degree.

(R., pp.22-23.)

The State appears to have initially

alleged that Mr. Moses had kidnapped and robbed Joshua Branam and, in the process,
extorted money from Mr. Branam's brother-in-law, Walter Ward, as part of the
kidnapping scheme. (R., pp.22-23.)
Following a preliminary hearing the district court granted the State's motion to
amend the charges and Mr. Moses filed a motion to dismiss.
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(R., pp.81-82.)

The

grounds for this motion were that the State had not presented sufficient evidence as to
each of the elements of the charged crimes, the State failed to file an information in
support of its charges, and procedural defects occurring during the preliminary hearings
violated Mr. Moses' right to due process. (R, p.81.)
Thereafter, the State filed an Information alleging only that Mr. Moses committed
grand theft by extortion.

(R, pp.85-86.) The State further alleged within this same

information that Mr. Moses was a persistent violator for purposes of imposition of a
sentencing enhancement.

(R, pp.85-86.)

Both of Mr. Moses' prior alleged felony

convictions arose out of Washington State. (R, p.86.)
Based upon Mr. Moses' arguments in his motion to dismiss, the trial court
remanded his case back to the magistrate for a new preliminary hearing. (R, pp.101105, 110.)

However, the court denied his request to dismiss the charge outright.

(R, pp.101-105, 109.)
At this hearing, Mr. Branam testified upon a grant of immunity for his testimony at
this preliminary hearing. (12/10/10 Prelim. Tr., p.1, L.12 - p.6, L.1, p.48, L.18 - p.78,
L.23.) Mr. Branam testified he fabricated the kidnapping in an attempt to obtain money
from his brother-in-law. Mr. Ward. (12/10/10 Prelim. Tr., p.50, L.23 - p.51, L.25.) At the
time he made the phone call to Mr. Ward claiming to have been kidnapped, Mr. Branam
testified that he was in a separate room in the garage of a residence and that nobody
else participated in making the phone call with him. (12/10/10 Prelim. Tr., p.52, L.24 p.53, L.18.)
Mr. Branam further testified the reason for demanding money from his brother-inlaw was that the funds in his banking account had been frozen, but he had
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subsequently paid Mr. Ward back the money that was paid out for the faked kidnapping.

(12/10/10 Prelim. Tr., p.53, L.19 - p.54, L.9.)

Mr. Branam testified he then asked

Mr. Moses to go pick up something from Mr. Ward for him, but he did not tell Mr. Moses
what it was that he was supposed to pick up, and Mr. Moses did not know what he was
delivering when he dropped the money off for Mr. Branam. (12/10/10 Prelim. Tr., p.54,
Ls.23-25, p.55, Ls.14-25.)

Mr. Branam specifically testified Mr. Moses did not

participate in the phone call Mr. Branam placed to Mr. Ward in which he claimed to have
been kidnapped. (12/10/10 Prelim. Tr., p.55, Ls.1-3.)
The district court ultimately found the State had presented sufficient evidence to
bind Mr. Moses over for trial. (12/10/10 Prelim. Tr., p.91, L.15 - p.92, L.3.) Following
this preliminary hearing, the State filed a new Information alleging Mr. Moses had
committed grand theft by extortion, as well as alleging that he was a persistent violator
for purposes of imposing a sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.202-203.)
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to admit statements made
during the phone conversation between Mr. Branam to Mr. Ward, ostensibly as an
"adoptive admission" by Mr. Moses.

(R., pp.208-210.)

Despite a lack of proof

Mr. Moses was even present at the time the phone call was made, and the fact the only
voice Mr. Ward heard in the background was that of a "Hispanic male,,,1 the State
asserted Mr. Branam's statements during this conversation should be imputed to
Mr. Moses and should be admitted for proof of the matter asserted as an adoptive
admission under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(B). (R., pp.208-210.)

1 Mr. Moses is not Hispanic. (Tr., p.372, Ls.6-22.)
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At the pretrial hearing, Mr. Moses opposed the State's motion. He noted that
Mr. Branam was the only person who could testify as to who was present when the
phone conversation occurred and who was actually able to hear what Mr. Branam was
saying to Mr. Ward. (Tr., p.35, L.6 - p.37, L.5, p.38, L.i6 - p.39, L.i8.) Mr. Moses also
noted that Mr. Branam was not listed as one of the potential witnesses to be called by
the State attrial. (Tr., p.35, Ls.i8-24.)
In response, the State simply asserted Mr. Moses was a participant in the phone
conversation where Mr. Branam made the statements at issue but did not present any
evidence to substantiate this representation. (Tr., p.4D, Ls.7-i2.) The district court then
recited its understanding of the facts, including that Mr. Branam, during the phone
conversation, handed the phone "to someone who may be the defendant," and that,
"all this other person does, whether it's Mr. Moses or somebody else, is build upon
that." (Tr., p.4D, Ls.i8-21 (emphasis added).)
The court never made any finding Mr. Moses was actually present during the
phone conversation, that he had heard Mr. Branam's remarks, or that his conduct
evinced acquiescence in the statements Mr. Branam had made. (Tr., p.4D, L.i3 - p.4i,
L.17.)

Instead, the district court found there was sufficient foundation to admit

Mr. Branam's statements as adoptive admissions against Mr. Moses, despite the fact
that there was no proof Mr. Moses was present when Mr. Branam made the statements
at issue. (Tr., p.4i, Ls.i-15.)
The State's first witness at trial was Phillip Connell.

(Tr., p.165, Ls.7-8.)

Mr. Connell was a friend of Mr. Ward's - going back to grade school - and was driving
around with Mr. Ward to various ATMs on the day of the supposed kidnapping and
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alleged extortion. (Tr., p.165, L.13 - p.167, L.6.) After Mr. Connell and Mr. Ward went
to various cash machines and collected $2,500, Mr. Connell testified the two eventually
travelled to a nearby Walmart parking lot in order to deliver the money. (Tr., p.167, L.17
- p.169, L.21.) According to Mr. Connell's testimony, Mr. Ward then got out of the
vehicle and returned a short time later with Mr. Moses. (Tr., p.170, L.11 - p.171, L.14.)
Mr. Moses then allegedly placed a small motor scooter in the back of the vehicle
and sat in the passenger seat. (Tr., p.171, L.15 - p.172, L.6.) Mr. Connell testified
Mr. Ward then gave the money to Mr. Moses, who put it in his pocket. (Tr., p.172, L.11
- p.173, L.15.) As the three left the Walmart parking lot and began to drive to pick up
Mr. Branam, Mr. Connell claimed Mr. Moses said it was "ugly business" and he didn't
like the idea of having to kill someone. (Tr., p.173, Ls.16-23.) Mr. Connell also claimed
Mr. Moses told him and Mr. Ward that his uncle was the person who had orchestrated
the supposed kidnapping based on a drug debt.

(Tr., p.177, L.2 - p.178, L.10.)

However, Mr. Connell admitted on cross-examination he never put any of Mr. Moses'
alleged statements in the police report he filled out that same day. (Tr., p.187, L.19 p. 188, L.4.)
Mr. Moses eventually directed Mr. Ward and Mr. Connell to a trailer park and got
out of the vehie/e.

(Tr., p.175, L.22 - p.176, L.3.)

Mr. Connell did not see where

Mr. Moses went after getting out of the car and driving away on the scooter. (Tr., p.179,
Ls.4-15.)

About ten minutes later, Mr. Branam came out of the same trailer park

carrying a plastic bag. (Tr., p.179, L.16 - p.181, L.1.) Mr. Connell testified Mr. Branam
had injuries to his face, a black eye, and that he appeared to be shaken, nervous and
scared.

(Tr., p.180, Ls.9-20.)

After Mr. Branam got in the car, Mr. Ward and
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Mr. Connell drove him to a house and dropped him off. (Tr., p.i8i, Ls.i7-2i.) Then
Mr. Connell and Mr. Ward located a police officer and filled out a police report.
(Tr., p.i82, Ls.i-9, p.i86, L.23 - p.i87, L.8.)
The State also called Mr. Ward to testify at Mr. Moses' trial. (Tr., p.2i0, Ls.i820.) Mr. Ward testified that he and Mr. Branam were related by marriage - Mr. Ward is
Mr. Branam's brother-in-law.

(Tr., p.2ii, Ls.7-25.)

Prior to the alleged extortion,

Mr. Ward testified that his wife and Mr. Branam had inherited a fairly substantial sum of
money. (Tr., p.2i2, L.i6 - p.2i3, L.3.) Less than a month later, Mr. Ward received a
phone call in the early morning hours from Mr. Branam. (Tr., p.2i5, L.5 - p.2i6, L.i3.)
Mr. Moses renewed his objection to the State presenting Mr. Branam's alleged
statements during this conversation for the truth of the matter asserted under the guise
of an adoptive admission under I.R.E. 801. (Tr., p.237, Ls.8-ii.) Despite this, the trial
court permitted Mr. Ward to testify Mr. Branam had told him during this conversation
that he needed $2,500 because he had been kidnapped.

(Tr., p.237, Ls.3-i9.)

Mr. Ward also testified Mr. Branam told him that he could be killed if Mr. Ward didn't
provide the money. (Tr., p.237, L.24 - p.238, L.1.)
After the phone conversation, according to Mr. Ward's testimony, he left his
house and went to various ATM machines until he was able to pull together the $2,500
demanded as part of the purported kidnapping. (Tr., p.217, Ls.5-21.) He then went to
the Walmart in Post Falls to deliver the money. (Tr., p.218, Ls.15-17.) After attempting
to call the number he was instructed to call, Mr. Ward testified the was eventually
approached by Mr. Moses in the parking lot. (Tr., p.219, L.11 - p.220, L.7.)
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Mr. Ward testified he shook Mr. Moses' hand and then motioned for him to get in
the passenger seat of Mr. Ward's vehicle.

(Tr., p.220, Ls.11-19.)

According to

Mr. Ward, he then showed Mr. Moses the money, Mr. Moses took the cash and told
Mr. Ward where to go to find Mr. Branam. (Tr., p.220, L.20 - p.221, L.14.)
During this car trip, Mr. Ward claimed that Mr. Moses made several statements.
First, he testified Mr. Moses stated that "taking a life wasn't easy and it wasn't
something that you ever wanted to do." (Tr., p.233, Ls.5-10.) Although the prosecutor
specifically asked that Mr. Ward not provide context for this remark, on crossexamination Mr. Ward admitted this alleged statement by Mr. Moses was in response to
Mr. Ward saying that he had killed several people. (Tr., p.233, Ls.5-S, p.297, Ls.9-16.)
Mr. Ward also testified Mr. Moses informed him Mr. Branam owed Mr. Moses' uncle the
$2,500 for a drug debt and called Mr. Branam an offensive name. (Tr., p.235, L.23 p.236, LA.) According to his testimony, Mr. Ward believed Mr. Moses was the other
individual who was part of the phone call during which Mr. Branam claimed to have
been kidnapped. (Tr., p.236, Ls.12-21.)
Mr. Moses eventually directed Mr. Ward to a trailer park. (Tr., p.225, L.3 - p.226,
L.11.) He then got out of Mr. Ward's truck and began pushing his scooter down the
road. (Tr., p.226, Ls.12-1S.) A short time later, Mr. Ward saw Mr. Branam emerge out
of the trailer park, but Mr. Ward did not see which trailer he came out of. (Tr., p.22S,
Ls.14-22.) Mr. Branam was carrying a water bottle and a "garbage sack." (Tr., p.229,
Ls.24-25.) He also had facial injuries and bruising. (Tr., p.229, Ls.14-23.) Mr. Ward
testified he thought Mr. Branam looked nervous and thankful to see his brother-in-law.
(Tr., p.229, Ls.3-6.) After getting into Mr. Ward's car, Mr. Branam asked Mr. Ward for a
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cigarette, and then asked to be dropped off at an intersection. (Tr., p.230, L.13 - p.231 ,
L.25.)
According to Mr. Ward, he then went to pick up his wife and attempt to contact
the police. (Tr., p.232, Ls.1-9.) On the way to the sheriff's station, he and his wife saw
a police officer, so they pulled into the parking lot where the officer was parked and told
the officer what they believed had happened. (Tr., p.232, Ls.9-19.)
Trial proceedings recessed prior to Mr. Moses' cross-examination of Mr. Ward.
However, prior to these proceedings resuming the next day, there were several issues
relating to the jury that emerged. First, two of the jurors seated in Mr. Moses' trial were
in a car accident with each other. (Tr., p.285, Ls.19-22.) One of the jurors was arrested
on an outstanding warrant and remained incarcerated the morning of the second day of
trial.

(Tr., p.286, Ls.17-22.) In response, the district court determined that this juror

would be deemed an "alternate" for purposes of the trial proceeding.
But another problem emerged with a third juror who informed the district court
that he suffered from anxiety issues and was not sure he could continue to be a juror
given "the contentious nature of the proceedings."

(Tr., p.285, L.22 - p.287, L.3.)

Mr. Moses asked the court for an opportunity to inquire further of this juror. (Tr., p.288,
Ls.13-22.) His specific concern was whether, in the throes of a potential anxiety attack,
this juror would be able to hear the testimony and "take in the testimony as it comes in."
(Tr., p.288, Ls.13-22.) The State objected to the juror being questioned because the
State didn't want the juror to be singled out.

(Tr., p.288, L.25 - p.289, L.10.) The

district court thereafter denied Mr. Moses' request for further inquiry. (Tr., p.289, Ls.1116.) Rather than permit Mr. Moses to find out whether these anxiety issues had already
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interfered with, and might continue to interfere with, the juror's ability to hear and focus
on the evidence at trial, the district court instead merely "announced to the entire panel
that if anybody feels at any time that they do need a break, to please bring that to the
court's attention." (Tr., p.289, Ls.11-16.)
Following this ruling, Mr. Ward was recalled to the stand for cross-examination.
(Tr., p.291, Ls.10-17.) On cross-examination, Mr. Ward admitted Mr. Moses' alleged
statements about it not being an easy thing to kill someone was in response to
Mr. Ward's claim he had killed eleven people. (Tr., p.297, Ls.9-16.) He also admitted
he had not put any of Mr. Moses' alleged statements in the written report of the alleged
kidnapping that he provided for the police. (Tr., p.297, L.19 - p.298, L.6.) When asked
about the voice he heard during his conversation with Mr. Branam, Mr. Ward testified
that the voice sounded Hispanic. (Tr., p.298, Ls.16-22.) Mr. Ward also testified he had
never spoken with or met Mr. Moses prior to the day of the alleged kidnapping and
extortion. (Tr., p.298, L.25 - p.299, L.5.)
Regarding Mr. Moses' behavior on that day, Mr. Ward testified the was friendly
and conversational in his demeanor. (Tr., p.304, Ls.19-23.) Mr. Moses did not have
any observable weapons, did not try to disguise his appearance, and did not try to
escape from Walmart even after Mr. Ward handed him the money. (Tr., p.304, L.24 p.307, L.7.)
Prior to trial, Mr. Branam informed the district court; through counsel, he would
be asserting his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination if he were to be
called to testify about his involvement in the charges against Mr. Moses. (Tr., p.63, L.11
- p.64, L.23.) This was confirmed by Mr. Branam' counsel following the State's case-in-

10

chief. (Tr., p.346, Ls.5-B.) As a result, the district court found that Mr. Branam was
unavailable and permitted Mr. Moses to read portions of his preliminary hearing
testimony into the record under I.R.E. 804(b)(1). (Tr., p.347, L.7 - p.363, L.20.)
Mr. Moses first presented the testimony of his step-father, Larry Ertz, at trial.
(Tr., p.371, L.21 - p.372, L.5.) Mr. Ertz had known Mr. Moses since he was 13 yearsold. (Tr., p.372, LsA-5.) According to Mr. Ertz, Mr. Moses was not Hispanic, did not
have a Hispanic accent, and did not live in California or any other location from the time
he was thirteen from which he would have developed an accent of that derivation.
(Tr., p.372, Ls.6-22, p.373, L.20 - p.374, L.9.)
Next, Mr. Branam's testimony from Mr. Moses' preliminary hearing was read into
the record. (Tr., p.396, L.12 - pA24, L.12.) Mr. Branam testified he alone made the
phone call to his brother-in-law, Mr. Ward, in which he claimed to have been kidnapped
and he did so because he needed money. (Tr., p.397, L.13 - pAOO, L.10.) He made
this phone call from a room near the garage of the residence that he was in, and
although people were coming and going from this room, no one was with him while he
made the calls. (Tr., pA01, Ls.1 0-11, 15-18.)
As part of his plan to get money, Mr. Branam testified he told Mr. Ward he would
be hurt if Mr. Ward did not pay. (Tr., pA01, L.25 - pA02, LA.) Apparently, Mr. Branam
then asked Mr. Moses to go pick the money up for him, but did not tell Mr. Moses what
exactly it was that he would be picking up. (Tr., pA02, Ls.10-24.) Mr. Branam testified
Mr. Moses did not take part in the phone conversation with Mr. Ward. (Tr., pA02, L.25
- pA03, L.2.) Mr. Branam also testified Mr. Moses does not have a Hispanic accent.
(Tr., pA13, Ls.15-19.) When Mr. Moses returned with the money, he told Mr. Branam
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that Mr. Ward was waiting for him outside the trailer park, so Mr. Branam went outside
to see Mr. Ward. (Tr., p.4i7, Ls.3-6.) According to his testimony, Mr. Branam received
the injuries to his face from a fight he was in with Mr. Moses days prior. (Tr., p.4i7,
L.20-p.4i9, L.ii.)
In response to the introduction of Mr. Branam's prior testimony from the
preliminary hearing, the State called two witnesses purportedly as impeachment. The
State recalled Mr. Ward to the stand. (Tr., p.429, Ls.22-24.) Mr. Ward testified he was
present at this preliminary hearing and before Mr. Branam testified, he gestured to
Mr. Ward and mouthed the words, "This is all a lie." (Tr., p.430, L.8 - p.432, L.2i.)
Mr. Moses objected to the introduction of this testimony as hearsay, but his objection
was overruled by the trial court. (Tr., p.432, L.i7 - p.433, L.5.)
He also testified as to a conversation that Mr. Ward claimed to have had with
Mr. Branam while Mr. Branam was incarcerated.

(Tr., p.435, L.6 - p.438, L.3.)

Mr. Ward claimed Mr. Branam said he lied in his preliminary hearing testimony because
he was afraid of reprisal from Mr. Moses - specifically, that he would be killed.
(Tr., p.436, Ls.8-i3.)

Mr. Ward also testified Mr. Branam had described the

circumstances of his kidnapping.

(Tr., p.436, L.i7 - p.437, L.5.)

Once again,

Mr. Moses objected on hearsay grounds, but his objection was overruled. (Tr., p.437,
Ls.7-i8.) According to Mr. Ward's testimony, Mr. Branam claimed Mr. Moses tied him
to a chair, repeatedly pistol-whipped him, placed the barrel of a gun in his face, and
threatened him and those close to him. (Tr., p.437, L.i9 - p.438, L.3.)
The State also presented Officer Scott Harmon, who testified to out-of-court
statements allegedly made by Mr. Branam about the alleged kidnapping and extortion.
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However, the alleged statements were made to a police officer in the course of
conducting a criminal investigation. Officer Harmon had already testified in the State's
case-in-chief about his role in investigating the alleged kidnapping. (Tr., p.332, L.13 p.338, L.22.) In this capacity, he interviewed Mr. Branam. (Tr., p.336, L.23 - p.337,
L.6.)
Without any objection from Mr. Moses, the officer testified as to the statements
made by Mr. Branam to Officer Harmon during the investigation. (Tr., p.441, L.17 p.443, L.7.)

Mr. Branam told the other he met Mr. Moses through his girlfriend.

(Tr., p.442, Ls.8-15.) At some point, according to Mr. Branam's out-of-court statement
to the officer, Mr. Moses taped Mr. Branam to a chair and beat him until he gave
Mr. Moses $1,500 which, apparently, Mr. Branam happened to be carrying on his
person at the time. (Tr., p.442, Ls.15-22.) The officer testified Mr. Branam then claimed
to have been pistol-whipped by Mr. Moses prior to leaving to collect the ransom for
Mr. Branam's kidnapping. (Tr., p.442, L.23 - p,443, L.7.)
Mr. Moses thereafter sought to introduce the testimony of two witnesses to
rehabilitate Mr. Branam's testimony through prior statements made by Mr. Branam that
were consistent with his preliminary hearing testimony.

(Tr., p.463, Ls.12-17.)

Following an offer of proof as to these witnesses' testimony the district court only
allowed one of the witnesses to testify on grounds other than admission of a prior
consistent statement under I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). (Tr., p.463, L.18 - p.470, L.2.)
Christian Beech testified he was present for and overheard a conversation
between Mr. Branam and Mr. Moses.

(Tr., p.478, L.17 - p.479, L.6.)

During this

conversation, Mr. Moses asked Mr. Branam whether there was actually any kidnapping.
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(Tr., p.481 , Ls.14-19.)

According to Mr. Beech, Mr. Branam denied a kidnapping

occurred. (Tr., p.481, Ls.20-21.) In describing the tone of voice and body language of
Mr. Moses and Mr. Branam during this conversation, Mr. Beech testified the two
appeared relaxed. (Tr., p.482, Ls.12-17.) Mr. Beech also denied that he was afraid of
Mr. Moses or Mr. Branam. (Tr., p.482, Ls.18-24.)
The jury found Mr. Moses guilty of grand theft by extortion and that he was a
persistent violator (Tr., p.531, L.25 - p.532, L.5, p.556, Ls.1-11; R, p.299.) Mr. Moses
was sentenced to 30 years, with 10 years fixed, and the district court retained
jurisdiction over his case.

(Tr., p.588, Ls.10-18; R., pp.314-316.) Mr. Moses timely

appealed from his judgment of conviction and sentence. (R, p.317.)
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals determined that Mr. Moses was entitled
to a new trial based upon the district court's refusal to permit any further inquiry of the
juror who had expressed doubts about his capacity to continue to deliberate due to his
anxiety issues. (State v. Moses, 2013 Opinion No. 25, pp.3-11.) The Court of Appeals
further held that the district court erred in refusing to permit Mr. Moses to present
surrebuttal evidence under I.RE. 801(d)(1)(B) and that the prosecutor in Mr. Moses'
trial factually mischaracterized the immunity agreement between Mr. Branam and the
State during closing arguments; although the court did not find error in the admission of
some of Mr. Branam's statements as adoptive admissions against Mr. Moses. (State v.
Moses, 2013 Opinion No. 25, pp.11-15.)

This Court granted the State's petition for review as to the issues presented in
this appeal. (Order Granting Respondent's Petition for Review.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it permitted Mr. Branam's statements to Mr. Ward
to be introduced under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(8) as an adoptive admission by
Mr. Moses despite a lack of foundation?

2.

Did the district court err when the court refused to permit inquiry about a juror
who expressed reservations about his ability to participate given the anxiety
issues the juror was experiencing?

3.

Did the district court err when it refused to permit Mr. Moses to call a witness to
the stand to testify about Mr. Branam's prior consistent statements after the court
had allowed the State to present Mr. Branam's prior inconsistent statements?

4.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by shifting the burden of proof to
Mr. Moses during closing arguments?

5.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error,
by arguing facts not in evidence, misstating the evidence, and appealing to the
passions and prejudices of the jurors?

6.

Does the cumulative error doctrine require reversal in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Permitted Mr. Branam's Statements To Mr. Ward To
Be Introduced Under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(B) As Adoptive Admissions By Mr. Moses Despite
A Lack Of Foundation

A

Introduction
Mr. Moses asserts the district court erred when it admitted statements made by

Mr. Branam to Mr. Ward during a phone conversation as adoptive admissions
attributable to Mr. Moses under I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(B), because the State failed to establish
the necessary foundation for admission of such statements under this rule.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The district court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence, and its decision to admit evidence will be reversed only where there has been
a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521
(2003). This Court applies a three-part test with regard to the question of whether the
district court abused its discretion. First, this Court examines whether the district court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion.

Id.

Second, this Court reviews

whether the district court acted within the proper bounds of its discretion and consistent
with the legal standards attendant to its determination.

Id.

Finally, this Court must

determine whether the district court reached its discretionary determination through an
exercise of reason. Id. Where the defendant objects to the error, the State bears the
burden of establishing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Permitted Mr. Branam's Statements To
Mr. Ward To Be Introduced Under I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(B) As Adoptive Admissions
By Mr. Moses Despite A Lack Of Foundation
Mr. Moses asserts the district court erred when it permitted the State, over

Mr. Moses' repeated objections, to introduce statements made by Mr. Branam to
Mr. Ward as adoptive admissions by Mr. Moses, because the State failed to lay the
required foundation for admission of the statements.
There appears to be only one published decision in Idaho addressing the
introduction of the statement of another as an "adoptive admission" of the defendant
pursuant to I.R.E. 801 (d)(2)(B). See State v. Nguyen, 122 Idaho 151,155-156 (Ct. App.
1992). While the Nguyen opinion deals largely with a challenge to the defendant's
inability to confront the makers of the statements imputed to him as an adoptive
admission, the court does provide some guidance as to the foundation required by the
proponent of the evidence prior to its admissibility. Id.
First and foremost, the party seeking admission of the evidence has the burden
to prove sufficient foundation to establish that adoption of the statement was intended.
Nguyen, 122 Idaho at 156.

While the specific burden is not detailed with great

specificity in Nguyen, it includes proof that "the defendant heard, understood, and
acquiesced in the statement." Id.
The Nguyen opinion is consistent with the holdings of other jurisdictions with
regard to the foundational requirements that must be met prior to the admission of such
evidence. See, e.g., U.S. v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381, 384 (9 th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Joshi,
896 F.2d 1303, 1311-1312 (11 th Cir. 1990). At the very least, the party offering the
evidence must show that the party to whom the statement is to be imputed: (1) heard
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the statement; (2) understood what was being said; and (3) the circumstances were
such that it would be reasonable to expect him to respond. Id. The burden is also on
the State to prove adoption of the statement was intended. See State v. Cookson, 657
A.2d 1154, 1157 (Me. 1995). It is the prosecution that bears the burden of proving
these facts prior to the admission of the evidence because, in requiring this showing,
"the likelihood of erroneously admitting the evidence is Significantly diminished." Joshi,
896 F.2d at 1312.
At trial, the district court permitted the State to introduce Mr. Branam's
statements during a phone call to Mr. Ward as "adoptive admissions" by Mr. Moses.
(Tr., p.40, L.13 - p.41, L.8.) These statements included claims that Mr. Branam had
been kidnapped and would be killed if Mr. Ward did not provide $2,500. (Tr., p.237, L.3
- p.238, L.1.) The State did not attempt to introduce the transcript from any of the
preliminary hearings into evidence in support of its request, nor did the State present
any testimony to the district court. 2
The sole "evidence" the State presented was the prosecutor's mere assertion
that Mr. Moses was also talking to Mr. Ward during the phone conversation. (Tr., p.37,
L.16 - p.38, L.2.) However, the arguments of the parties are not evidence in criminal
proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Fondren, 24 Idaho 663 (1913).

Because the State

presented no evidence that Mr. Moses was actually present when Mr. Branam made the
statements to Mr. Ward, no evidence that he understood what Mr. Branam was saying,

To the extent the preliminary hearing would have had any bearing on this issue,
Mr. Branam testified Mr. Moses was not present for, and did not participate in, the
phone call placed to Mr. Ward in which he falsely claimed to have been kidnapped.
(12/10/10 Prelim. Tr., p.55, Ls.1-3.)
2
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and no evidence Mr. Moses intended to adopt these remarks as his own, the State did
not meet its evidentiary burden to admit these statements as an adoptive admission
against Mr. Moses.
Moreover, the district court's findings in support of admitting these statements as
adoptive admissions demonstrate there was insufficient foundation for their admission.
The court found during the phone conversation, Mr. Branam handed the phone "to
someone who may be the defendant," and "all this other person does, whether it's
Mr. Moses or somebody else, is build upon that."

(Tr., p.40, LS.1S-21 (emphasis

added).) By the court's own findings, the State merely demonstrated someone, who
may be Mr. Moses, was present at the time of the phone call, and that built upon
Mr. Branam's statements. 3 There is no finding by the court that this person was actually
or even likely Mr. Moses who was present, who heard and understood the statements,
and who assented to these remarks.
Thus, the State failed to establish the necessary foundation to admit
Mr. Branam's statements as though they were Mr. Moses' own under I.R.E.
S01 (d)(2)(B).

Accordingly, the district court erred when it permitted the State to

introduce this evidence at trial as an adoptive admission on the part of Mr. Moses.

This mirrors the State's own acknowledgement in closing arguments about the
evidence that tended to show Mr. Moses was not present for and was not a participant
in this phone call. (Tr., p.506, L.S - p.50S, L.1S.)
3
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II.
The District Court Erred When It Refused To Permit Inquiry About A Juror Who
Expressed Reservations About His Ability To Participate Given The Anxiety Issues The
Juror Was Experiencing

A.

Introduction
The district court in this case prevented Mr. Moses from making any inquiry of a

juror when that juror informed the court he did not feel he could continue in the case due
anxiety issues. Because Mr. Moses had a constitutional right to have a competent jury
hear and receive the trial evidence presented, the district court erred in preventing him
from ensuring this juror was competent to proceed.

B.

Standard Of Review
Constitutional questions are questions of pure law, and therefore are reviewed de

novo by this Court. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67 (2001).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Refused To Permit Inquiry About A Juror Who
Expressed Reservations About His Ability To Participate Given The Anxiety
Issues The Juror Was Experiencing
Prior to the second day of trial, one of the jurors brought to the court's attention

concerns that he was having anxiety issues and "was not sure he could continue" to sit
as a juror on the case.

(Tr., p.285, Ls.22-24.)

The juror's anxiety issues were

apparently being spurred by the contentious nature of the trial proceedings. (Tr., p.286,
L.23 - p.287, L.3.) Despite Mr. Moses' concerns that these anxiety issues may have
interfered, and may continue to interfere, with the juror's ability to hear and pay attention
to the evidence at trial, the district court erroneously refused to permit Mr. Moses to
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make any inquiry of the juror as to the impact of the juror's condition on his ability to
receive the evidence. (Tr., p.289, Ls.11-16.)
The right to trial by competent jurors is a critical right that was recognized under
Idaho law even prior to statehood. While a trial court may place some limitations on the
rights of the parties to question a juror as to competence, "the right of a party to know
whether a juror is qualified and competent is a substantial right that cannot, under our
law, be denied." United States v. Alexander, 2 Idaho 354, 17 P. 746, 749 (1888). The
right to a trial by competent, qualified jurors is protected both by the Sixth Amendment
and by the protections afforded by constitutional due process.

See, e.g., Morgan v.

Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 726 (1992); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972); Jordan v.
Com. of Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912). Thus, a defendant has a due process

right to a jury comprised of people who are mentally and physically capable of hearing
and receiving the evidence at trial. Id.
Included within this Sixth Amendment right is the opportunity to adequately
question a juror regarding his or her capacity or qualifications to serve as a juror. As
was noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Morgan, "part of the guarantee of a
defendant's right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified
jurors." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. While Mr. Moses did have the opportunity to question
the potential jurors prior to trial, this particular juror's physical and/or mental reaction to
the trial proceedings did not become apparent until he was already seated and tasked
with hearing and evaluating the evidence in this case. Mr. Moses had a constitutional
right to adequately inquire of this juror in order to ensure his Sixth Amendment rights
were protected.
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While there is a dearth of case law on this issue, Idaho case law has recognized
other circumstances, aside from actual bias or partiality, that may require the removal of
a juror.

For example, this Court has recognized that the intoxication of a juror may

require the court to remove the juror if this intoxication would interfere with the juror's
ability to receive the evidence. See, e.g., Walsh v. Winston Bros. Co., 18 Idaho 768,
111 P. 1090, 1094-1095 (1910). Although the Court in Walsh did not find that removal
of the juror was required, this was only due to the fact that the defendant - after being
afforded a hearing on the matter - was unable to show that the juror was "in a condition
which incapacitated him from performing his duties as a juror during the actual progress
of the trial." Id. at 1095. But the Walsh Court also cautioned that, "Trial courts should
be very careful to see that jurors properly conduct and deport themselves after having
been accepted as jurors, and they should not tolerate or permit any act or indulgence
which in any way will incapacitate the juror from performing his duty or deny to the
litigants a fair and capable judgment of the jurors." Id.
The anxiety being experienced by the juror in this case is certainly not
blameworthy in any sense. However, this anxiety was - in the juror's own estimation interfering with his ability to sit as a juror to the point where he expressed concern as to
whether he could continue to sit in the case. (Tr., p.286, L.23 - p.287, L.3.) And the
Walsh Court makes clear that part of the trial court's on-going duty is to ensure that a
defendant has a jury comprised of those who are capable of performing their duties as a
juror during the progress of the trial.
More recently,

the

Idaho Court of Appeals

has

suggested that juror

inattentiveness or sleeping during trial may form a basis for a mistrial or the removal of
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the juror from the jury. See State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437,440-441 (Ct. App. 2006). In

Bolen, the defendant sought a new trial after the verdict based upon some evidence that
the jurors were not paying attention, were doodling during the presentation of evidence,
and were sleeping during the course of the trial. Id. at 439. The Bolen Court held that
the district court properly denied the motion for a new trial because a defendant must
seek relief from the court during the course of the trial where they are aware of the
problems with members of the jury, rather than seeking to wait until the verdict has been
rendered to seek relief for these concerns. Id. at 440-441.
The Bolen case is important for this Court because this is exactly what
Mr. Moses sought to do at trial. According to Bolen, a defendant must seek relief from
the trial court at the time he or she becomes aware of potential jury misconduct during
the course of the trial. Id. at 440.

Additionally, the Bolen court noted that addressing

these issues during the course of the trial, rather than after, would permit the court to
conduct an adequate inquiry into the matter and to take appropriate remedial steps
where necessary. Id. at 441.
Moreover, Idaho case law does not limit the defendant's right to trial by jury to
merely a jury that is unbiased - the right is framed in much broader terms. "A defendant
in a criminal case has not had due process of law when he has been tried and convicted
by a jury which did not measure up to constitutional and statutory requirements."

State v. Nadiman, 63 Idaho 153, 118 P.2d 58, 62 (1941).

Among the defendant's

constitutional rights, with regard to jury trials, is the right to "a tribunal both impartial and
mentally competent to afford a hearing."

Tanner v. U.S., 483, U.S. 107, 126 (1987)

(quoting Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912)); see also State v DeGrat,
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128 Idaho 352, 355 (1996). The Sixth Amendment right to a jury therefore carries with it
the right to an unimpaired jury, and this right is secured in part by the on-going oversight
of the trial court during the actual conduct of the tria/. Id.
In order to ensure that this right is protected, the remedy for allegations of juror
misconduct or lack of capacity to proceed, presented during trial, is a hearing in which a
defendant is permitted to establish a record regarding the juror's bias or incapacity.
See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-217 (1982). "Due process means a jury

capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge
ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such
occurrences when they happen."

Id. at 217.

And a hearing on the issue is the

appropriate manner in which to effectuate that right. Id.
Moreover, while Idaho has not yet had the occasion to address potential juror
incapacity due to anxiety or another mental condition, other jurisdictions have
addressed such an issue and determined that this may be an appropriate basis upon
which to dismiss a juror.

See, e.g., Sullivan v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1980);

Burtley v. State, 476 N.E.2d 835 (Ind. 1985); State v. DaSilva, 742 A.2d 721, 725-726

(1999).
Mr. Moses respectfully submits that the holding from DaSilva is particularly
instructive for this Court, as it deals with a juror who expressed similar reservations in
her ability to continue to deliberate in the underlying criminal trial that was already
underway. As in this case, the trial court refused to permit any further inquiry of this
juror after she expressed her reservations.

DaSilva, 742 A.2d at 724-725.

The

Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that this was error. The DaSilva Court held, "it is
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well settled that when questions concerning a juror's fitness are raised, the trial court
must conduct sufficient inquiry to make a reasoned determination whether the juror
should be discharged or may continue to serve.

The Sixth Amendment requires

'diligent scrutiny' to protect the defendant's right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury." Id.
at 725 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the State's assertion on review, the scope of the DaSilva case is not
limited to only those cases involving child molestation or even involving an express
concern regarding potential bias only. By its terms, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
was addressing circumstances where a juror's overall fitness is at stake - and this
standard can encompass a juror's capacity as well as his or her objectivity. In addition,
the court in DaSilva was pointedly directing its analysis on the juror's expressions
regarding her mental state, and whether the nature of the proceedings, "was having an
impact on the juror's state of mind and was having a chilling effect on her participation in
the deliberations." Id. at 725. These are the same core concerns that are present in
this case.
Moreover, the district court's failure to permit any further inquiry of this juror,
whether directly by Mr. Moses or by the court in light of defense concerns, would at the
very least constitute an abuse of the district court's discretion. As was noted by the
court in DaSilva, 'Tw]ithout further inquiry, the trial judge was not sufficiently informed of
the issue to adequately exercise his discretion." DaSilva, 742 A.2d at 726. Mr. Moses
submits that the district court failed to act within the bounds of reason in flatly denying
any further inquiry of any form, as this deprived the trial court of the information
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necessary in order to meaningfully exercise its discretion; and further failed to act within
the legal bounds of the trial court's discretion, given the constitutional issues at stake.
In this appeal, the State has posited that there can be no error in failing to permit
any inquiry of a jury expressing doubts as to his or her ability to continue to sit on a case
unless it is affirmatively established in the record that the jury in question is actually
mentally incompetent, biased, or otherwise properly subject to removal by the trial court.
(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.14-15.)

However, this

argument suffers from a central defect - in refusing to permit any further inquiry at all of
the juror in question, even in the face of that juror's concrete expression of his own
doubts as to his ability to continue to deliberate in the case, the district court
affirmatively deprived Mr. Moses of any opportunity to establish whether the juror's
anxiety was rendering him incapable of receiving the evidence at trial, which is among
the most basic and central functions for any juror in a criminal trial.
Here, the district court prevented Mr. Moses from questioning the juror about the
nature, frequency, effects, and extent of the anxiety issues he was suffering during the
trial.

By the juror's own account, he was "not sure he could continue" as a juror in

Mr. Moses' case. The court's refusal to allow Mr. Moses the opportunity to ensure the
juror was competent was error.
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III.
The District Court Erred When It Refused To Permit Mr. Moses To Call A Witness To
The Stand To Testify About Mr. Branam's Prior Consistent Statements After The Court
Had Allowed The State To Present Mr. Branam's Prior Inconsistent Statements

A.

Introduction
The district court in this case erroneously excluded evidence of Mr. Branam's

prior statements that were consistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, and which
Mr. Moses sought to admit after the State was allowed to introduce Mr. Branam's prior
inconsistent statements. In doing so, the court failed to correctly perceive the relevance
of Mr. Moses' requested evidence, failed to act consistently with applicable law, and
failed to act in accordance with reason.

B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court's decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed by this

Court for an abuse of discretion. Peny, 139 Idaho at 521.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Refused To Permit Mr. Moses To Call A
Witness To The Stand To Testify About Mr. Branam's Prior Consistent
Statements After The Court Had Allowed The State To Present Mr. Branam's
Prior Inconsistent Statements
In this case, Mr. Moses sought to present the testimony of two witnesses to

introduce prior statements made by Mr. Branam that were consistent with his
preliminary hearing testimony. (Tr., p.463, Ls.12-17.) Specifically, he asked to present
testimony from Mr. Beech and Ed Yankey regarding Mr. Branam's statements that
conformed to the substance of his preliminary hearing testimony.

(Tr., p.467, L.18 -

p.468, L.16.) Mr. Moses asked to present these witnesses in order to rebut the State's
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evidence of prior inconsistent statements that had been previously allowed by the trial
court. (Tr., p.463, Ls.5-11.) While the trial court permitted one of these witnesses to
testify - Mr. Beech - the court excluded the other witness and permitted Mr. Beech's
testimony on grounds other than that argued by Mr. Moses. (Tr., p.469, L.12 - p.470,
L.2.) Because the testimony of both witnesses was relevant and admissible pursuant to
LR.E. 801(d)(1)(B), Mr. Moses asserts that this was error.

Under LR.E. 801 (d)(1 )(B), a statement is not hearsay if it is "consistent with [the]
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against [the]
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." LR.E. 801(d)(1)(B).4
This rule is an elaboration of the well-established principle of law that, "upon
introduction of evidence which seemingly impeaches or contradicts a witness's
testimony, the witness must be permitted a reasonable opportunity to explain the
impeaching evidence." Openshaw v. Adams, 92 Idaho 488,492 (1968). Thus, where
the opposing party has raised the specter that testimony introduced at trial was the
product of fabrication, admission of a prior statement consistent with that testimony is
appropriate pursuant to LR.E. 801 (d)(1 )(B) and does not constitute hearsay. State v.
Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 732 (2001).
By the State's own characterization, it had offered two witnesses to present prior
inconsistent statements allegedly made by Mr. Branam for the purpose of attacking his

While the provisions of this rule generally require that the declarant testify at trial and
be subject to cross-examination, this requirement is obviated where a hearsay
statement has been admitted into evidence. See I.R.E. 806. Under the provisions of
I.R.E. 806, in such circumstances, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked or
supported, "by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant
had testified as a witness." LR.E. 806 (emphasis added).
4

28

credibility and implying that he had a motive to fabricate his preliminary hearing
testimony. (Tr., p.429, L.22 - p.443, L.7.) In addition, Mr. Moses specifically argued the
admissibility of this testimony as a prior consistent statement admissible under
!.R.E. S01 (d)(1). (Tr., p.465, Ls.S-20.) Despite this, the district court denied Mr. Moses'
request to admit the testimony of Mr. Yankey under an apparent misapprehension of the
function of evidence of a prior consistent statement pursuant to this rule.
The district court was under the apparent and erroneous belief that, because it
was Mr. Ward who presented the testimony of Mr. Branam's prior inconsistent
statements, any prior consistent statements presented to rebut this evidence would be
directed at Mr. Ward's credibility, rather than Mr. Branam's. (Tr., p.464, Ls.13-20.) In
doing so, the court misapprehended the relevance of this evidence and its admissibility
at trial. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in excluding Mr. Yankey's
testimony.
Moreover, the presentation of the testimony of Mr. Yankey would not have been
merely cumulative of that provided by Mr. Beech, as the circumstances surrounding
Mr. Branam's statement to Mr. Yankey had independent and substantial probative value
for purposes of rebutting the State's claim of fabrication. According to Mr. Moses' offer
of proof, Mr. Yankey would testify he was housed in the same area as Mr. Branam
when he was incarcerated, and he had a conversation with Mr. Branam. (Tr., p.46S,
Ls.21-23.) During part of this conversation, Mr. Branam asked whether Mr. Yankey had
seen Mr. Moses in court.

(Tr., p.46S, Ls.23-24.) When asked by Mr. Yankey why

Mr. Branam would be concerned about Mr. Moses' case, Mr. Branam responded that
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Mr. Moses "was in jail because of him, and he shouldn't be in jail because Josh Moses
didn't do anything wrong." (Tr., p.469, Ls.3-7.)
Given the circumstances detailed in Mr. Moses' offer of proof as to Mr. Yankey's
testimony, Mr. Branam's statements were provided in a context where he was not facing
any particular threat from Mr. Yankey or Mr. Moses.

Where the circumstances

surrounding the making of the prior consistent statement demonstrate a greater
likelihood of truth independent of any alleged prompting or influence, such statements
have substantial probative value. See, e.g., State v. MeA way, 127 Idaho 54,59 (1995).
Accordingly, the exclusion of this evidence by the trial court cannot be said to have
been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

IV.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, And Violated Mr. Moses' Constitutional Right
To Due Process, By Shifting The Burden Of Proof To Mr. Moses During Closing
Arguments

A.

Introduction
Mr. Moses asserts that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when

Mr. Verharen presented closing argument to the jury that impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof to Mr. Moses.

B.

Standard Of Review
For alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct followed by a contemporaneous

objection, this Court must make two determinations: first, whether misconduct occurred;
and, second, whether misconduct was harmless.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 220.

defendant bears the initial burden to show that misconduct occurred.
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The

However, the

State bears the burden of showing to the reviewing court, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Id. at 228.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed By Misconduct, And Violated Mr. Moses'
Constitutional Right To Due Process, By Shifting The Burden Of Proof To
Mr. Moses During Closing Arguments
During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statement to the jury

regarding to the court's instructions about the State's burden to prove intent beyond a
reasonable doubt, "If you think about that instruction, it may lead you down the path of
what is the evidence that establishes that [Mr. Moses] was ignorant of what was
really going on?"

(Tr., p.512, LS.8-11 (emphasis added).)

Following this remark,

Mr. Moses objected and asserted this argument improperly sought to shift the burden of
proof from the State to Mr. Moses. (Tr., p.512, Ls.18-22.) This objection was overruled
by the court. (Tr., p.512, L.23.) Mr. Verharen then continued:
The evidence that the defense is relying on to support that
instruction that he was ignorant of what was really happening is the
testimony of Mr. Branam.
Mr. Branam is not all that credible.
Mr. Branam has some issues. Mr. Branam is at least in a position that's
hard to attach any weight to what he says in terms of his testimony
because of his drug use, because of his motivation, but that's what the
defense is relying on and nothing else.
(Tr., p.512, L.24 - p.513, L.7 (emphasis added).)
Mr. Moses asserts because this argument improperly sought to shift the burden
to Mr. Moses to disprove criminal intent, an element of the charged offense, it
constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
"The requirement that the State prove every element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process." State v.
Felder, 150 Idaho 269, 274 (Ct. App. 2010).
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Accordingly, it is misconduct for a

prosecutor to distort or diminish the State's burden to prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. /d.; State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685-686 (Ct. App.
2010).
Here, the prosecutor first suggested to the jury that they might examine the issue
of whether Mr. Moses had the requisite criminal intent from the perspective of whether
the evidence disproved his intent, rather than whether the evidence proved this fact.
This was a fundamental distortion of the presumption of innocence that is essential to
the relative burdens of proof in a criminal trial.

Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685.

Upon

Mr. Moses' objection being overruled, the State continued its improper argument with
repeated statements about the evidence Mr. Moses was "relying on" in order to
establish his defense.

This language implied to the jury Mr. Moses bore some

evidentiary burden of disproving the intent element of the State's charge in this case.
Because the prosecutor's argument erroneously intimated to the jury Mr. Moses had the
evidentiary burden to disprove criminal intent, this argument was improper and
constituted misconduct.

v.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error,
By Arguing Facts Not In Evidence, Misstating The Evidence, And Appealing To The
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jurors

A.

Introduction
Mr. Moses asserts that the prosecutor in committed misconduct rising to the level

of a fundamental error when he misinformed the jury regarding the nature of the
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immunity granted to Mr. Branam for his preliminary hearing testimony, and appealed to
the passions and prejudices of the jury.

B.

Standard Of Review
In cases where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial,

this Court will review the alleged error for whether the misconduct alleged rises to the
level of a fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). In cases of
unobjected to error, this Court applies a three-step process of review.

First, the

defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights were violated. Id.

Second, the error must be clear and obvious

from the record without the need for additional information not contained within the
record on appeal.

Id.

Finally, the defendant must show the error affected the

defendant's substantial rights.

Id. As to this last prong, the defendant must show a

reasonable possibility that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental
Error, By Arguing Facts Not In Evidence, Misstating The Evidence, And
Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jurors
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law

as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including
reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair triaL" Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The prosecutor in this case
attempted to induce the jury to render a verdict on factors other than the evidence
introduced at trial.

First, the prosecutor misled to the jury as to the terms of that

agreement by telling the jury Mr. Branam faced absolutely no penalty for anything he
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might say at the preliminary hearing when, in fact, the immunity agreement set forth
numerous potential penalties should Mr. Branam testify falsely.

In addition, the

prosecutor used inflammatory language regarding Mr. Branam's preliminary hearing
testimony and used this appeal to the jurors' emotions as a vehicle to seek to induce
them to disregard this important evidence at trial.
The prosecutor's closing argument violated Mr. Moses' right to due process and
constituted fundamental error, because the prosecutor affirmatively and egregiously
misled the jury as to the actual terms of the immunity granted to Mr. Branam.
Mr. Verharen told the jury in closing arguments:
You'll recall from the testimony that was read to you that Mr. Branam can't
be testified -- can't be prosecuted for what he said in that statement that
was read to you. He was given immunity. Basically, it means that
whatever he says he can't get in trouble for, so whatever he says
might as well benefit himself.
What benefits him is staying in
[Mr. Moses'] good graces.
(Tr., p.527, LS.3-9 (emphasis added).)
This, stated bluntly, was a lie.

The actual immunity agreement entered into

between the State and Mr. Branam provided severe sanctions for false testimony.
(R., p.31.) Specifically, this agreement provided that Mr. Branam, "may nevertheless
be prosecuted or subjected to penalty for perjury, false swearing, or contempt
committed in testifying at the aforementioned preliminary hearing."

(R., p.31

(emphasis added).) The prosecutor deliberately led the jurors to believe Mr. Branam
could testify to anything at all, including false or perjured testimony, with no
recriminations when he knew the opposite was true.

This egregious misstatement,

calculated to mislead the jury as to the nature of the circumstances under which
Mr. Branam testified, rose to the level of a violation of Mr. Moses' right to due process.
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See a/so State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial
misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error where the prosecutor misstated the
evidence, misstated the law, and appealed to the passions and prejudice of the jury).
Additionally, the prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to the level of a
fundamental error, when he used inflammatory language intended to incite the passions
and prejudices of the jury in an attempt to persuade the jurors to disregard vital
evidence. It is so well-established as to be axiomatic that it is improper for a prosecutor
to appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury, or to appeal to the emotions of the
jurors, in seeking conviction. See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 227; State v. Johnson, 149
Idaho 259,266 (2010); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2008); Beebe, 145
Idaho at 575; State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651,656-657 (Ct. App. 1984).
With regard to Mr. Branam's preliminary hearing testimony that was read to the
jury, Mr. Verharen argued, "You can take that transcript, and you can put it in the

garbage.

You don't have to rely on anything that that man said, nor should you."

(Tr., p.529, Ls.21-23 (emphasis added).)

In referring to Mr. Branam's testimony as

"garbage," particularly on the heels of misleading the jury as to the circumstances
surrounding this testimony, the prosecutor was making an improper appeal to the
passions and prejudice of the jury. This, too, violated Mr. Moses' due process rights to
fairness during his trial proceedings.
These due process violations are apparent from the face of the record and are
clear violations of well-established law. Moreover, there is a reasonable probability this
misconduct affected the outcome of Mr. Moses' trial. Most of the exculpatory evidence
in Mr. Moses' trial came from Mr. Branam's preliminary hearing testimony that was read
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into the record. This testimony clearly reflected that Mr. Moses had no prior knowledge
of, or intentional participation in, any plan to extort money from Mr. Ward. Rather, it was
only Mr. Branam who orchestrated this ruse in order to obtain money for himself. By
urging the jury to disregard this testimony through an appeal to the jurors' emotions, and
misleading the jury as to the terms of the immunity agreement, the State took improper
steps to discredit the most crucial evidence to Mr. Moses at trial. Accordingly, there is
every reason to believe the prosecutor's improper argument affected the outcome in this
case.

VI.

The Cumulative Error Doctrine Requires Reversal In This Case
Mr. Moses asserts each of the errors that occurred in his trial, standing alone,
warrant reversal of his conviction for grand theft by extortion.

However, even if the

individual effect of these errors did not require reversal, Mr. Moses asserts the
aggregate effect of the multiple errors occurring in his trial demonstrate this Court
should reverse his conviction.
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair triaL" Perry, 150 Idaho at
230. In this case, there were multiple errors occurring at trial, each one impacting on
Mr. Moses' right to a fair trial. Given the existence of so many trial errors, that each had
a substantial impact on Mr. Moses' due process right to fairness in his criminal
proceedings, coupled with the overall weakness of the State's evidence, Mr. Moses
asserts the cumulative effect of the errors in his case require reversal of his conviction.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Moses respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2013.

E. TOMPKINS
State Appellate Public Defender
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